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Rent Control and Virtual Prices: A Case 

Study for Interwar Belgium 

LEONBETTENDORFAND ERIKBUYST 
After World War I rent control became a cornerstone of housing policy in many European 

countries, resulting in quantity constraints on the demand for housing. The theory on 

complete demand systems provides a framework for analyzing the effects of these policies 

on consumption. As a test case, a demand model is estimated to calculate virtual rent prices 

for intenvar Belgium. The results are well in line with historical evidence: providing insight 

into the extent of rationing. Simulations with the demand model show that the severe rent 

restrictions especially favored expenditures on food. 

In the nineteenth century, housing markets in western Europe were usually free of government control. World War I brutally disrupted the fragile 
equilibrium between the supply and demand of housing. Where the war was 
fought many houses were destroyed. Elsewhere, shortages of building mate- 
rials, high mortgage rates, and uncertainty caused a sharp reduction in resi- 
dential construction. The resulting housing shortage threatened to send rents 
sky high, so rent control became a cornerstone of housing policy, even in 
neutral countries.' Contrary to original expectations, rent control proved to 
be more than a temporary wartime measure. Postwar inflation and unantici- 
pated difficulties in resolving the housing shortage delayed the removal of 
rent restrictions considerably. In Britain, the first steps towards deregulation 
of rents were taken in 1923, but decontrol only gained momentum in the 
1930s; on the eve of World War I1 about 30 percent of all dwellings were 
still subject to rent restrictions.* In France rent control remained in effect 
until 1937.3 In many respects the interwar period can be considered the 
heyday of rent f r e e ~ e . ~  
The impact of rent control on the housing market is a much debated issue 
in economic research. Recently, it again has become a subject of contro- 
v e r ~ y . ~It is striking that in historical studies little use has been made of 
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'1n Sweden and Switzerland, for instance, the housing shortage during World War I was severe 
enough to impose rent controls (Stromberg, "Sweden," p. 21; and Kurz, "Arbeiter," p. 288). 
'Richardson and Aldcroft, Building, pp. 189-90. 
3Lescure, Irnnzobilier, p. 140. 
4For an overview, see Pooley, Housing Strategies. 
'For an overview, see Amott, "Time," pp. 99-120. 
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modern microeconomics in general and of so-called complete demand sys- 
tems in particular to settle the debate. Using rents in interwar Belgium as a 
test case, we investigate in this article the effects of rent restrictions by 
calculating "virtual rents" on the basis of estimated demand models (what 
would the level of rents have been without control given the observed quan- 
tities?). After a short overview of rent control in interwar Belgium, we 
briefly discuss demand theories, without and with rationing. It is shown that 
both theories can be linked using the concept of virtual prices. The virtual 
price is the price the consumer would be willing to pay voluntarily for the 
actual quantity supplied. A demand model is estimated using Belgian inter- 
war and post-World War I1 data. This provides the necessary information 
to calculate virtual rent prices, the size and evolution of which give a more 
precise insight into the extent of rationing. Finally, the demand model is 
simulated with alternative patterns for the controlled rent prices to analyze 
further the effects of rationing on consumption. 
RENT CONTROL IN INTERWAR BELGIUM 
Belgium is for several reasons an interesting case of rent control. During 
World War I about 84,000 houses, more than 5 percent of the housing stock, 
were completely or partially destroyed. At the same time, new construction 
came to an almost complete ~tandstill.~ The resulting housing shortage be- 
came acute after the armistice as the nearly 600,000 Belgian refugees in 
France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands returned home.' Surveys of hous- 
ing conditions in the 1920s present a compelling picture of overcrowding. 
In many cases several households had to share a single-family dwelling.* 
Figure 1 illustrates the deterioration of housing conditions during and irnme- 
diately after World War I. 
In order to keep the situation under control, the Belgian Parliament de- 
cided in August 19 19 to extend leases and to limit rents to a maximum of 30 
percent above the level reached in August 1914. A year later, in order to 
overcome the resistance of refractory owners, local authorities were autho- 
rized to claim unoccupied houses. As a sop to the owners, the limit for rent 
increases was in some cases raised to 50 percent of the August 19 14 level.9 
Nevertheless, landlords continued to oppose rent control fiercely, and not 
surprisingly since consumer prices (rents excluded) had risen more than 350 
percent over the same period. lo 
Why were rents in Belgium restricted to such a low level? Belgian offi- 
%uyst, Economic History, pp. 188 ,222. 

'Schepens, "Belgie," p. 27. 

"obyn, "Woningnood," p. 185; and Baudhuin, Histoire kconomique, vol. I ,  p. 103. 

'For a detailed overview of Belgian rent legislation, see Henau, "Belgische huishuren," pp. 10-17. 

''Calculated from Banque Nationale de Belgique, Statistiques kconomiques, p. 40. 
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FIGUREI 

NUMBER OF FAMILIES PER HOUSE, BELGIUM, 1913-1939 

Source: Data were calculated from Buyst, Economic History, pp. 26041,263.  
cials firmly believed that postwar inflation was essentially a temporary 
phenomenon. The government expected that prices would soon start to 
decline to prewar levels. ' l  From that perspective permitting steep rent in- 
creases would only have hampered the success of deflationary policies. Of 
course, the Belgian government's aim to reduce the general price level by 
a factor of 4.5 was unrealistic. Moreover, as the government continued to 
pursue lax budgetary and monetary policies in the early 1920s, it soon 
thwarted its own drive towards deflation.12 From the middle of 1922, con- 
sumer prices (rents excluded) started to rise again, forcing Parliament to 
permit some limited rent increases (see Table 1). 
The severe budgetary and monetary crisis of 1926 caused inflation to 
accelerate dramatically. As a result, the discrepancy between frozen rents 
and other consumer prices reached unprecedented heights. In October 1926 
consumer prices (rents excluded) had risen 600 percent since August 19 14, 
while rent increases were limited to a maximum of 125 percent. In such cir- 
cumstances, rent control, although originally designed to protect tenants, 
"van der Wee and Tavernier, Banque Nationale, pp. 33-36. 
1 2 ~ o r  and Cassiers, Croissance, pp.more details, see Buyst et al., "National Accounts," pp. 70-72; 
127-40; Hogg, Structural Rigidities, pp. 13-2 1 ;  and Mornrnen, Belgian Economy, pp. 1-1 0. 
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TABLE 1 : 

RENT RESTRICTIONS IN INTERWAR BELGIUM 

(percentage increase on August 19 14) 

Permitted Rent Increase 
(percentage) 
Date of Act or All Classes Class A Class B Class C Class D Date of 
Royal Decree of Dwellings Dwellings Dwellings Dwellings Dwellings A~plication 
25 August 1919 3 0 immediately 
14 August 1920 50 immediate1 y 
20 February 1923 100 immediately 
27 December 1924 125 immediately 
28 December 1926 free 225 175 150 immediately 
free 225 200 1928 
free 225 1929 
3 1 December 1929 600 immediately 
11 March 1938 700 immediately 
Notes: Class A dwellings are very expensive; Class B dwellings are expensive; Class C dwellings are 

medium-sized; and Class D dwellings are low-rent dwellings. Table 1 presents only the broad outline 

of rent control in Belgium. For a complete overview, see Buyst, Inkomen, pp. 10-12. 

Sources: Belgisch Staatsblad [Belgian Law Gazette], various issues. 

became more and more a financial punishment for landlords. The monetary 
crises of 1926 ended with the stabilization of the Belgian franc at one-sev- 
enth of its 19 14 gold parity. This steep devaluation of the franc dashed any 
hope of returning to the prewar price level. At the same time, the conviction 
grew-based on statistics that highly exaggerated actual building activ- 
ity-that the postwar housing shortage had largely been remedied.13 The 
government decided that time had come for progressive decontrol of rents. 
The Act of 28 December 1926 liberalized rents to a considerable degree. 
Four categories of dwellings (A, B, C, and D) were distinguished according 
to rateable value. Rents of very expensive dwellings (class A) became free 
in the course of 1927. In the case of expensive dwellings (class B) rents 
could be raised by up to 225 percent in 1927 and were to be decontrolled 
completely in 1928. The maximum rent of medium-sized dwellings (class C) 
was set at 175 percent in 1927 and 225 percent in 1928, with a free market 
from 1929. For low-rent dwellings (class D)  limited rent increases were 
permitted in the 1927 to 1929 period (see Table 1). l4 With effect from 1930, 
all compulsory extension of leases and rent restrictions would en&at least 
that was the intention. It turned out that a complete liberalization of rents 
was not feasible. In 1929 it was decided to continue rent control for some 
subcategories of class D dwellings. In exchange, a steep rent increase of 600 
percent vis-a-vis August 19 14 was allowed, which in 1938 was finally raised 
to 700 percent. 
I3~uyst ,Economic History, pp. 53-54, 69--70. 
I4Table 1 presents only the broad outline of rent control in Belgium. For a complete overview, see 
Buyst, "Inkomen," pp. 10-12. 
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This short overview clearly indicates that especially in the 1920s the 
Belgian government intervened extensively in the housing market. To what 
extent were legal regulations obeyed? This is an important issue as approxi- 
mately 65 percent of Belgian families were tenants in the interwar period.I5 
Research suggests that in general rent control was well observed until 1924. 
Thereafter the discrepancy between the frozen rents and consumer prices 
apparently became too wide. The stepwise increases prescribed by the Rent 
Act of 1926 were sometimes ignored: from 1927 to 1929 rents of low-rent 
dwellings occasionally rose considerably faster than permitted.I6 Anne 
Henau's rent index takes this problem into account as it is based on records 
of landlords that indicate the actual rent paid (Figure 2).17In the 1930s the 
maximum limit of rent increases was high enough not to disturb the normal 
functioning of the market for low-rent dwellings.I8 
Building activity responded swiftly to the decontrol of rents. The number 
of new houses constructed jumped from 27,000 per year between 1923 and 
1927 to 35,000 per annum during the period 1929 to 1933. Information from 
land registry documents indicates that the average size of newly built houses 
also increased after the relaxation of rent control.I9 
THE THEORY ON DEMAND SYSTEMS 
The theory of complete demand systems provides a consistent framework 
to explain the allocation of a consumer's budget over different cornmodi- 
ties." The microeconomic theory of consumption is built on the assumption 
that the consumer selects the best bundle that he can afford, given the avail- 
able financial means and the observed prices. From this framework follows 
that consumption of each commodity xi is determined by the budget m and 
all the prices p , ,  p,, . . . ,p, 
xi = f;m, P) i = 1,...,n (1) 
where n is the number of goods considered, m = (which is the sum of 
expenditures on individual goods has to equal total available means) andp 
"~efore  the 1947 census (61 percent tenants) quantitative information on Belgian housing tenure 
is lacking. Local inquiries suggest that the share of tenants was considerably higher in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Van den Eeckhout, "Belgium," p. 197). 
I6~eernan,Woningmarkt,p. 70; and Henau, "Belgische huishuren," pp. 17-18. 
I7Henau, "Belgische huishuren," pp. 17-1 8; and Buyst, Inkomen, pp. 17-18,25. 
I8Baudhuin,Histoire 6conomique, vol. 1, p. 104; Leernan, Woningmarkt,p. 70; and Buyst, Inkomen, 
p. 18. 
I 9 ~ o ra detailed account, see Buyst, Economic History, pp. 186207. 
20~xcellentoverviews of demand theory are given by Deaton and Muellbauer, Economics, p. 438; 
Phlips, Applied Consumption, p. 33 1 ;  and Thomas, Applied Demand, p. 104. Application to historical 
data can be found in Schokkaert and Van der Wee, "Quantitative Study," pp. 131-58; and Pepermans, 
"De inkomens," pp. 3 11-24. 
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denotes the vector of n- price^.^' A standard starting point is the logarithmic 
specification of equation 1 in differential form:22 
Aln xi = qiAln m + EjeaAln p, (2) 
where Aln stands for the change in the logarithm of the variable. The param- 
eter q iis interpreted as the income elasticity of commodity i, and eijthe 
elasticity of demand for good i with respect to the price of j. From the defi- 
nition of the budget share wi =p&,/m and the budget restriction follows: 
Aln m = Sw,Aln xj + EjwjAln p, (3) 
Substituting equation 3 in equation 2 and multiplying both sides with wi 
yields the so-called Rotterdam parametrization in differential form: 
with 
bi + wiqi 
Sq = W,  (eq+ q .W .)i
An intercept ai is included to reflect trend shifts. The next explanatory 
variable equals the percentage change in nominal income minus a weighted 
sum of price changes and can thus be interpreted as the change in real in- 
come. Coefficient bi therefore represents income effects, as reflected in the 
expression for income elasticity qi=bilwi.Coefficient siigives the own com- 
pensated price effect while the sg (izj) give cross-price effects. The term 
compensated here means that real income is kept constant by adjusting 
nominal income after price changes.23 The sign of sijgives an indication of 
the direction of interaction between the commodities. When sg> 0, a price 
increase of good j results in an increased (compensated) demand for good 
i and the two goods are said to be substitutes; when su< 0 the commodities 
are complementary. The compensated price elasticities are calculated as 
sulwi,and the uncompensated price elasticities equal eii= (sii- biwj)/ wi. 
Notice that the elasticities are not constant in time since they depend on the 
variable budget shares. 
The framework from which the demand equations are derived implies 
four types of restrictions. With the Rotterdam specification these restrictions 
can easily be imposed on the estimation, yielding an advantageous decrease 
in the number of coefficients to be estimated. The first set of constraints 
21To be more specific, equation 1 is derived from the first-order conditions of max,{u(x),subject to 
plx=m), where u(x)denotes the utility function. The demand function can be extended with other taste 
determining variables. 
22See Barten, "Consumer Allocation," pp. 139-40; and Schokkaert and Van der Wee, "Quantitative 
Study," pp. 155--57. 
23For infinitesimal price changes, holding real income fixed is equivalent to holding utility fixed, see 
Varian, "Microeconomic Analysis," p. 144. 
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concerns the adding-up conditions C,ai= 0, Chi= 1 and C g v= 0. These 
restrictions follow from the budget constraint: changes brought about ir 
expendilres on individual goods always have to sum up to the change in the 
total budget. Second, homogeneity is imposed with xjs, = 0. This implies 
the absence of money illusion: a proportional change in income and all 
prices does not affect the quantities consumed. Third, symmetry is expressed 
as su= sji. The (compensated) effect of a change in pjon xi equals the (com- 
pensated) effect of a change inpion xj.The fourth is the negativity condition 
on the matrix S. The main implication is that sii<O (Vi)meaning that (com- 
pensated) demand decreases following an own-price increase. 
When the consumer cannot allocate his budget freely but is confronted 
with quantity constraints, the framework has to be adjusted to incorporate 
rationing effects.24 Suppose for simplicity that the quantity constraint is 
imposed for only one good: xh = The quantities 2 of the 3, with p r i ~ e p , . ~ ~  
remaining n, goods can be freely chosen with corresponding price vectorp 
(from now on, p is an n,-vector, withoutp,). The constrained quantity 3, 
will have spill-over effects on demand for unrationed goods, as shown by 
the demand functions holding under rationing:26 
The equivalent of the Rotterdam specification with rationing can be derived 
as (where time subscripts t are added): 
@, AZn% =q +gi(AZn (m, -phtfh,) -ZjGjtAZnpjt)+Zfu AZnpjt +5,AZn Ph, 
i , j =1,...,n, (6) 
where 
Git = pitfitl(mt -phtXht) (share in total uncommitted expenditures) 
Ti = rationing coefficient with ZiZi = 0 
Similar theoretical restrictions hold on coefficients di, gi, Su, and Ti. 
John Neary and K. W. S. Roberts showed the equivalence between de- 
mand models with and without rationing by defining virtual prices.27 The 
virtual price p, refers to that price that would induce an unrationed con- 
sumer to choose exactly the ration level voluntarily, or: 
3, ==fh (&,p,ph) and zi =J; (&,p,Ph) =X(m,p,zh,ph) i = 1,. . . . ,5 (7) 
with virtual income f i  =m +@, -p,)f,. In other words, a free individual 
only restricted by virtual income and faced with virtual prices would pur- 
2 4 ~ o r  and Bettendorf and a more elaborate discussion, see Neary and Roberts, "Theory," pp. 25-35; 
Barten, "Rationing," pp. 2-4. Neary, "Rationing," pp. 92-96, provides a nontechnical overview. 
"The framework can easily include quantity constraints for several goods. 
Z~ormally,equation 5 is derived from max, [ u ( ~ , x ~ ) , s .  =t.p'Y +ph%,, m]. 
"Neary and Roberts, "Theory," pp. 3 1-3 5. 
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chase the observed bundle (f,R,). Or, abolishing the quantity constraint 
while changing the price to its virtual level would leave the optimal bundle 
unaffected and all markets would clear when supply is kept constant. 
By means of the equalities in equation 7 one can show that the derivatives 
of rationed demand equations with regard to each of the exogenous variables 
can be expressed in terms of the derivatives of the corresponding free de- 
mand equations when evaluated at virtual prices.28 First, for the derivative 
with regard to the ration level holds that 
where the superscript c denotes compensated demand.29 By the law of de- 
mand the denominator is negative such that the sign of af:/%, is the oppo- 
site sign of that of ax,"ldp,. When the latter is positive (negative) goods i 
and h are substitutes (complements) and raising the ration level will 
de(in)crease good i's compensated demand. 
Second, the effect of a change in nominal income can be decomposed into 
the normal income effect without rationing and a spill-over effect from 
rationing:30 
a2,ldm = dx,ldm - (dx";la.Z,) (dx,ldm) (9) 
Normally ax, / a m  > 0 and the sign of the spill-over effect depends on the 
substitute-complement relationship from equation 8. Finally, compensated 
price changes too under rationing have a direct and an indirect effect:31 
The second term reflects that a change in the price of an unrationed good too 
affects the extent to which a consumer is tied down by the quantity con- 
straint. 
These equalities imply that results on unrestricted demand functions can 
be employed to understand behavior under rationing. Calculation of the 
virtual price p, is an interesting exercise to assess the real extent of the 
rationing. In the next section estimation of a free (equation 4) and a con- 
strained (equation 6) demand model is combined with equations 8 to 10 to 
compute the virtual price of rents in interwar ~ e l g i u r n . ~ ~  
28~ppendix2 gives the expressions of these derivatives for the specific demand equations 4 and 6. 
29This is equation 19 of Neary and Roberts, "Theory." 
30~ompareequation 24 of Neary and Roberts, "Theory." 

3'For example, see equation 28 of Neary and Roberts, "Theory." 

3 2 ~ h e 
models were estimated with the program DEMMOD; see Barten and Geyskens, "Negativity 
Condition," pp. 227-60. Technical details on the calculation of virtual prices can be found in 
Bettendorf and Barten, "Rationing." For data, see Table 2 and N.I.S., "Nationale Rekeningen," various 
issues. The computer program used is available from the authors on request. 
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TABLE2 

CLASSIFICATION AND BUDGET SHARES 

(percentage) 

Mean Mean 
Variable Description 1920 1939 192&1939 1953-1 993 
FOOD Food 45.4 31.1 36.0 22.5 
BET0 Beverages and tobacco 10.7 8.3 9.8 6.7 
CLCA Clothing, footwear, personal 
care, and health 11.1 11.4 11.1 16.2 
RENT Rent 5.1 14.9 10.9 9.9 
HELI Heating and lighting 5.1 6.3 5.3 5.3 
TR CO Transport and communication 3.0 5.7 4.7 7.2 
W ~ E  Entertainment and recreation 8.8 8.5 9.9 8.7 Durables and others 10.8 13.8 12.3 23.5 
Source: Schroeven, Consumer Expenditure, pp. 246-49; and Buyst, Inkomen, p. 22. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
First, the Rotterdam model, equation 6, is estimated with per capita ex- 
penditure data for Belgium from 1920 to 1 9 3 9 . ~ ~  Control of the housing 
market was assumed effective for the whole period in order to obtain suffi- 
cient observations. A problem of this choice is that years with a strict rent 
control are combined with years with less binding rationing. In order to 
check the sensitivity of the outcomes to the last years, experiments with 
smaller samples were performed. The smallest sample for which the proce- 
dure still converged consisted of the period 1920 to 1935. The resulting 
virtual prices turned out to be fairly robust to the number of observation^.^^ 
Methods that give smaller weights to years characterized by a less controlled 
housing market are thought to result in higher virtual prices. 
Data on private consumption and spending on housing were classified 
into 8 aggregates (n,=7),as described in Table 2. The relaxing of rent con- 
trol is clearly mirrored by an almost tripling of the budget share of housing 
in the sample. The estimated coefficients and standard errors are found in 
Appendix 1; the implied elasticities evaluated for the mean share are re- 
ported in Table 3. The income elasticities show that all goods were luxury 
items, except FOOD and HELI, and all demands were rather insensitive to 
own price changes. Remarkable is that the ration level for RENT is only 
significant in the CLCA-equation, indicating that a 1 percent increase in the 
quantity of housing reduces demand for CLCA with 5.6 percent. In this 
context, it is interesting to point out that Angus Deaton estimated a demand 
33Whereas the theory deals with an individual consumer, this empirical part is applied to aggregated 
data. We assume that a representative household involves aggregation problems; in particular, the fact 
that households are affected to a different extent by rent control is ignored. Among others, the type of 
rationing scheme should be considered in an analysis with heterogenous agents, see Gould and Henry, 
"Effects," pp. 4 2 4 9 .  
341n the smallest sample 1926 becomes an outlier. 
&:, 
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TABLE 3 

ELASTICITIES RESTRICTED ROTTERDAM MODEL 192Cb1939 

Elasticity FOOD BET0 CLCA HELI TRCO LEIS OTHE 
q~ 0.524 1.591 1.342 0.536 1.25 1 1.789 1.075 
C 

Eli -0.099 -0.508 -0.277 -0.358 -0.787 -0.527 -0.1 19 
&it -0.3 10 -0.683 -0.445 -0.390 -0.854 -0.726 -0.268 
Y, 1.177 0 . 1 2 3  5 . 6 3 7  2.987 2.279 0.774 1 . 0 3 0  
Notes: qL = 6,1Gi (income elasticity) 
E:. = Si,lGi(compensated own price elasticity) 
e,, = E:. - qifli (uncompensated own price elasticity) 
y ,  = i,lG, (elasticity with regard to quantity RENT) 
where l i i  is the mean share in total uncommitted expenditures. The coefficients are taken from 
Appendix Table 1. 
system under rationing with post-World War I1 British data.35 He found that 
an increase in rationed housing depressed food and clothing expenditure and 
stimulated spending on transport and communication. 
The parameters of equation 4 describing behavior in the absence of ration- 
ing are estimated on data for the period 1953 to 1993 (see Appendix Table 
2).36Clearly, the allocation of the budget differed between periods (see 
Table 2), as is also shown by the estimated average elasticities (see Table 4). 
HELI now has the highest income elasticity, whereas TRCO has become 
income inelastic (the negative income coefficient of RENT is not signifi- 
cant). The own price elasticities remain rather small. 
On the admittedly strong assumption that the estimated demand model for 
the years 1953 to 1993 can be used to represent the behavior of an unra- 
tioned consumer in the interwar period, the estimated coefficients of both 
TABLE4 

ELASTICITIES UNRESTRICTED ROTTERDAM MODEL 1953-1993 

Elasticity FOOD BET0 CLCA RENT HELI TRCO LEIS OTHE 
qi 0.653 1.097 1.161 -0.031 1.642 0.586 1.028 1.602 
-0.290 -0.454 -0.542 -0.029 -0.305 -0.201 -0.204 -0.180 
E,, -0.437 -0.526 -0.730 -0.026 -0.392 -0.243 -0.293 -0.556 
Notes: q, = b, / wi (income elasticity) 
E" = sj/ W, (compensated own price elasticity) 
E ,. = E:, - qiwj (uncompensated own price elasticity) 
where w,is the mean budget share of Table 2, last column. The coefficients are taken from Appendix 
Table 2. 
35Deaton, "Theoretical and Empirical Approaches," p. 70. 
36~etween1945 and 1952 relatively strict rent controls were imposed again in Belgium. Therefore 
this period is left out of consideration (for more details, see Buyst, Economic History, pp. 233-34). 
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I Observed 
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-..-..-.,- General Index 
FIGURE 2 

THE PRICES OF RENT IN LEVELS 

models can be used to evaluate the derivatives in equations 8, 9, and 10. For 
each year, these equalities can be considered as a system of equations in one 
unknown, p, .  The value of P ,  that best fits this system is selected." As a 
simple alternative, virtual prices might be calculated by means of a single 
unrestricted demand equation for housing in the postwar period. However, 
this method does not make proper use of the analytical relationships nor of 
the information contained in the observed expenditures on other goods in the 
prewar and postwar periods. Experiments with this alternative have yielded 
poor results and the approach based on the two demand models was chosen. 
The resulting virtual prices, as given in Figures 2, 3, and 4, are well in 
line with the description of Section 2. Figure 2 shows that the level of virtual 
rent corresponds far better to the general price index (RENT excluded) than 
to the controlled price.38 The monetary crisis of 1926 is reflected in the 
highest increase in virtual rent in 1927 (+34.8 percent, Figure 3). While the 
observed price rose sharply in 1930 (50.5 percent), inflation rates of the 
virtual and the non-RENT price were already declining. The ratio of virtual 
to observed rent (solid line in Figure 4) gradually fell from 2.8 in 1920 to 
37The value of a,,that minimizes the sum of the square of the deviations between the lefthand side 
and the righthand side of equations 8,9, and 10 is chosen. 
380bserved prices are calculated as indices, equal to 1 in 19361938.The general price index (rent 
excluded) is calculated as Ei$,pi, ( i  = 1,.  ..,n,). 
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FIGURE 3 

THE PRICES OF RENT IN PERCENTAGE CHANGE 

0.9 in 1939, illustrating the relaxation of rent-control policies in the late 
1920s. To check the robustness of the results, computations were repeated 
with the coefficients of Appendix Table 1 and Appendix Table 2, increased 
and decreased by their standard errors, respectively. Figure 4 shows that the 
central ratio seems to indicate a lower bound for all years.39 
THE EFFECTS OF RENT CONTROL ON CONSUMPTION 
The estimated restricted demand model can be used to simulate the effects 
of alternative rent control policies on cons~rnption.~~ In a "what-if' scenario, 
rent pricep, is assumed to change at the same rate as the general price index 
(rents excluded; see Figure 3) till 193 1 and is kept at the observed level from 
193 1 onwards (see Table 5, panel A). The ratio between the hypothetical 
and the observed rent price always exceeds one and evolves in line with the 
virtual ratio. Given the observed variables in 193 1, both quantities and 
39Sincep,, is a nonlinear function of the coefficients, the relative position of each of the curves 
cannot be known a priori. Furthermore, Bettendorf and Barten, "Rationing," pp. 7-8, show that 
calculations based on the alternative CBS-specification of the demand model does not alter the pattern 
found for the virtual price. 
40Pepermans, "De inkomens," pp. 320-22, has performed similar simulations but ignored rationing 
effects in the estimation. Comparing Pepermans's and our results should be done with care because of 
the use of different commodity classifications. However, Pepermans also concluded that the budget 
shares of FOOD and BET0 declined the most under constant total real consumption. 
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budget shares are calculated backwards from 1930 to 1920 by means ol 
equation 6. Note that this approach neglects the stimulating effect of higher 
rents on the quantity of housing supplied.41 
In a first case, total nominal expenditures m are kept constant at observed 
values. Holding m and 2, constant, a higher p, causes a fall in total uncom- 
mitted expenditures, ranging from - 14 percent to -3  percent. Since only 
income effects are involved and all unrationed goods have a positive income 
elasticity, the large increase in the budget share of RENTis compensated by 
a decrease in all other budget shares, especially of FOOD. As the relative 
increase inp, gets smaller, the effects on the budget shares diminish. 
In a second hypothesis, the total nominal budget is changed to keep real 
consumption constant after the increase in rents. The necessary rises of m, 
ranging from 10 percent to 2 percent (Table 5 ,  panel B), might be thought 
of as coming from an increase in government transfers, a rise in income or 
a decrease in savings. The rise in the budget share of RENT is smaller since 
its denominator rn now also increases. All other budget shares decrease, 
reflecting that the quantitities consumed rise less than the budget. Compared 
to the first case, the shares of income inelastic goods FOOD and HELI fall 
by even more since they benefit relatively less from the enlarged budget. 
4 ' ~ h esupply of housing is assumed perfectly inelastic whereas the supply of free goods is assumed 
perfectly elastic. 
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TABLE5 
SIMULATIONS WITH ALTERNATIVE RENT PRICES 
Change in Budget Shares 
(percentage points) 
Year Ratiop, Ratio m FOOD BET0 CLCA RENT HELI TRCO LEIS OTHE 
A. Constant Total Nominal Expenditures 
B. Constant Total Real Expenditures 
Ratio rn 

1920 1.10 -4.8 -1.5 -1.5 11.6 -0.5 -0.4 -1.4 -1.4 

1921 1.09 -4.2 -1.3 -1.3 10.2 -0.5 -0.4 -1.2 -1.2 

1922 1.08 -3.2 -1.2 -1.0 8.3 -0.4 -0.4 -1.1 1 . 0  

1923 1.07 -3.3 -1.0 -1.0 7.9 -0.4 -0.3 -1.0 -1.0 

1924 1.08 -3.2 -0.9 -0.9 7.7 -0.4 -0.3 -0.9 -0.9 

1925 1.07 --3.0 -0.9 -0.8 7.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.9 -0.9 

1926 1.08 -3.3 -0.9 -0.9 7.8 -0.4 -0.4 -1.0 -0.9 

1927 1.08 -3.4 -1.0 -1.1 8.6 -0.5 -0.4 -1.1 -1.1 

1928 1.07 -2.7 -0.8 -1.0 7.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.9 -1.0 

1929 1.06 -2.3 -0.8 -0.8 6.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -0.9 

1930 1.02 -0.8 -0.4 -0.4 2.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 

The reverse holds for income elastic goods. 
These simulations show that the observed rent policies especially favored 
food consumption. These results are illustrated by historical evidence. In the 
early 1930s Belgian miners complained bitterly that the sharply rising bud- 
get share of rents forced them to cut back drastically on food expend i t~ re .~~  
Of course, this was due not only to the effects of rent decontrol but also to 
the sharp increase in (temporary) unemployment and thus reduced income. 
CONCLUSION 
As in other western European countries, the Belgian housing market had 
rent controls in the 1920s. The large difference between the time path of 
rents and the general price level (rents excluded) together with the steep rise 
in rents after the liberalization of the housing market around 1930 suggest 
42~riesen,"Zomerstakingen," p. 147. 
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that rent restrictions in Belgium were very severe. Using a Rotterdam de- 
mand model, virtual rents were calculated. The ratio of virtual to observed 
rents reached 2.8 in 1920 and fluctuated around 2 in the period from 1923 
to 1929. These figures not only confirm that Belgian rent control was ex- 
tremely tight in the 1920s but also give a clearer picture of its trend over 
time. 
A counterfactual exercise assuming that rents in the 1920s followed the 
general price index (rents excluded) instead of their actual course shows that 
the effects of rent restrictions on consumption were substantial. Assuming 
total nominal expenditure constant, the budget share of rents in 1920 would 
have been 13 percentage points higher than observed. The difference de- 
clined in the early 1920s but still remained around 9 percentage points in the 
period fi-om 1922 to 1928. The budget shares of all other spending catego- 
ries benefitted from rent control, especially the consumption of food. By 
accident, liberalization of the Belgian housing market coincided with the 
outbreak of the Great Depression. At the same time that income came under 
severe downward pressure, rents rose substantially. As a result, the budget 
share of rents increased dramatically, thereby crowding out spending on all 
other items. 


- -  
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APPENDIX 2: EQUATIONS 8,9, AND 10 
The derivatives of the restricted and unrestricted demand equations can be expressed in 
terms of the coefficients as follows (the latter are evaluated at the virtual variable^):^^ 
dfic - 6 i p h ~ h. f l  m -
dTh PiRh 
(with m = m -phTh =total uncommitted expenditures) 
af ic  s..m 
- ri axlc - s,iii d.x,C - shl iii 
a ~ J  Pipj 'pi phPj 
43~e eB ttendorf and Barten, "Rationing," pp. 3-4. 
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